In the model I'm espousing, "smart" is not the purview of sentience, it is the purview of the body / brain. The purview of sentience is just to "witness", to "want", and to "will" - but not to "think".

Most essentially, my main premise is simply that "judgment" always implies the ability to "witness", and that "witnessing" is the unique purview of sentient perspectives. In other words:

1. Value judgments necessarily assume the ability to perceive.

2. The act of perception is unique to sentient perspectives.

3. Therefore, all value judgments (which would include anything we might refer to as "moral" judgments) are necessarily the sole purview of sentience.

If you can't agree with that, we might just be at a permanent impasse, because that logic just seems so unassailable to me that I really can't comprehend changing my mind on that.

But I also don't understand how that premise isn't compatible with what you've said about collaboration. I conclude my article, after all, with the hope that the majority of people will use lessons from game theory to help foster global collaboration.

The only real difference, I think, is that I don't call non-participants immoral.

Not all sentient perspectives, after all, are human. And not all human sentient perspectives are collaborative minded. But that doesn't make either the non-humans or the non-collaborative humans immoral. It just marks them as perspectives that I'm not willing to grant equal rights in my community.

FYI that I am about to be offline for the next week, so if you choose to continue the conversation, I probably won't get back to you for a while.